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China1. Introduction
In urban China an egalitarianism-oriented housing system was previously used to allocate free houses to urban residents
working in the state sector, which was the predominant provider of jobs (Cheng and Beresford, 2012). In the 1990s housing
reform gradually abandoned the old system and established a housing market. Since then housing has become a major topic in
urban China (Cheng, 2011, 2012). In 2009 the television drama woju (Dwelling Narrowness) that depicted the difﬁculty, and
frustration, of buying a home in cities provoked national discussion and debate on housing affordability confronting Chinese
households (Liang, 2010). Rapidly rising house prices and increasing housing inequality have been reshaping the Chinese urban
landscape and impacting on the subjective wellbeing of the urban population.
There are large economics and psychology literatures on the determinants of subjective wellbeing (see Dolan et al., 2008 for
a review). There are, however, relatively few studies on the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeingng), stephen.king@monash.edu (S.P. King), russell.smyth@monash.edu (R. Smyth), haining.wang@sdu.edu.cn
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Zumbro, 2014).2 Findings on the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing are mixed. Most studies have found
that homeowners have higher subjective wellbeing (see e.g. Stillman and Liang, 2010; Ruprah, 2010; Zumbro, 2014). However, Rossi
andWeber (1996) only found weak support for the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between home ownership and sub-
jective wellbeing, with many variables insigniﬁcant. Meanwhile, other studies have found that once one controls for demographic dif-
ferences, there is no evidence that homeowners have higher subjective wellbeing than non-homeowners (see e.g. Bucchianeri, 2009).
There is a growing body of literature on the determinants of subjective wellbeing in China (see e.g. Cheng, 2014; Cheng and
Smyth, 2015a, 2015b; Cheng et al., 2014, 2015, in press; Gao and Smyth, 2011; Knight et al., 2009; Mishra et al., 2014; Wang et
al., 2014). This study contributes to this literature through studying the relationship between home ownership and subjective
wellbeing in China. This study also contributes to the literature on the socioeconomic, demographic and political effects of housing
in comparative perspective (Zavisca and Gerber, in press). We present a theoretical model linking a gradient of property rights in
housing to subjective wellbeing in China and empirically test the predictions of the theoretical model. To do so, we use the China
Household Finance Survey (CHFS), which was collected from over 5000 urban residents in 2011 from all provinces and munici-
palities in mainland China, except Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Compared with other datasets that contain information on
home ownership and subjective wellbeing in China, such as the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), the CHFS has several ad-
vantages. Speciﬁcally, with the CHFS we are able to examine a range of ownership forms (full, partial and minor) and not only
consider whether homeowners have a home loan, but also the source of the loan. We are also able to control for a rich set of
confounding factors, including house value and household wealth.
A problem with examining the effect of home ownership on subjective wellbeing is that the estimates may potentially be
biased, reﬂecting concerns with endogeneity and omitted variables. While this means that our ﬁndings have to be viewed with
caution, we attempt to address these concerns in a number of ways. To address concerns with omitted variables bias we include
a rich set of confounding factors in the regressions, including house value, a number of indicators of household wealth, migration
status, work unit (danwei), employment relations (bianzhi), occupation, industry and province ﬁxed effects.
Weuse a range of alternative strategies to address concerns about endogeneity. First, of the potentially endogenous variables, income
is usually regarded as themost troublesome in subjective wellbeing regressions (see e.g. Knight et al., 2009). We instrument for income
usingboth a conventional instrumental variable (industry-occupation-province yearly household consumption expenditure per capita in
the year before the survey) and the approach recently proposed by Lewbel (2012), which is an identiﬁcation strategy that does not rely
on external instruments, but rather, constructs an internal instrumental variable based on the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data.
Second, as an alternative approach to addressing endogeneity we use matching estimates of the average treatment effect of
home ownership on life satisfaction.
Third, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) suggest that it is important to take account of ﬁxed individual traits in happiness
studies. Hence, as a further robustness check on the results from the CHFS, we used panel data for 2009–2011 from the China
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) and the 2010–2012 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) to conduct ﬁxed effects regressions.
Each of these approaches is explained in more detail in the methods section. Overall, it is reassuring that the main ﬁndings
with respect to home ownership are robust across methods.
The only study in the English language literature on the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing in
China is Hu (2013), who uses the 2006 CGSS. Hu (2013) examines the relationship between a binary variable, home ownership,
and subjective wellbeing. Our study differs from Hu (2013) in several ways. First, we examine a more recent period, using a more
recent dataset. Second, in addition to considering the role of a binary variable, home ownership, we examine the role of different
types of property rights – full, partial and minor ownership – on subjective wellbeing. Third, unlike Hu (2013), we examine the
role of having a mortgage and a range of different sorts of home loans on subjective wellbeing. Fourth, unlike Hu (2013), we at-
tempt to address the endogeneity of income using a range of strategies as discussed above. Finally, and again in contrast to Hu
(2013), we control for a wider range of variables including household wealth and house value to minimize omitted variable bias.
Foreshadowing the main results, ﬁrst, we ﬁnd that home ownership is positively correlated with life satisfaction. Second, we
ﬁnd that full ownership, partial ownership and minor ownership are each positively related with life satisfaction and that the
coefﬁcient on full ownership is larger than partial ownership, which, in turn, is larger than minor ownership, consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical model.
2. Conceptual framework
In this section we present a simple model that captures several stylised facts about home ownership. Our model focuses on the
different ownership forms that exist in China and how these interact with an individual's subjective wellbeing. In this respect,
China not only has renters and homeowners; it also has different forms of home ownership. Homeowners can have full, partial
or minor ownership and these differ in terms of security and liquidity. Full ownership is where the owner has a property
deed issued by state authority, which is transferrable in the housing market. Partial ownership is where the owner does not
have a state-issued property deed. Partial property rights are usually acquired with housing purchased at prices subsidised by2 The related literature that examines the effect of home ownership on housing satisfaction includes Elsinga and Hoekstra (2005) and Diaz-Serrano (2009). There are
a few studies for China examining determinants of housing or residential satisfaction, including Chen et al. (2013) and Huang et al. (2015). While related to this study,
themain outcome variable of interest – housing satisfaction versus subjectivewellbeing– differ.We focus on the effect of housing property rights on a broadermeasure
of wellbeing than these studies.
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period with restrictions on the treatment of capital gains. This is usually levied in the form of a land use fee (Chen, 1996). Minor
homeownership (xiao chanquan) refers to housing with limited property rights, built on collectively owned rural land and sold to
buyers outside the collective ownership. Theoretically, this form of ownership is not ofﬁcially recognized and thus illegal in China,
although in practice it is a common phenomena in urban villages and suburban areas (Chen, 2010).
To capture these different forms of ownership, consider an individual i. Let xi refer to the individual's ownership status where
xi∈{0,m,p, f}. If xi=0 then the individual is renting, while xi∈{m,p, f} means that the individual is a home owner. If xi= f then the
individual has ‘full’ ownership, while ‘partial’ and ‘minor’ ownership are represented by xi=p and xi=m respectively. For
homeowners, both security of ownership and liquidity of ownership (i.e. ease of property sale) are ordered with f both more
secure and more liquid than p, which is more secure and liquid than m.
There is a range of variables that can affect housing choice for any individual. These include individual characteristics that may
directly impinge on life satisfaction, such as wealth, income, occupation and migration status. They also include variables that are
exogenous to the individual such as any province effects. In a perfectly unconstrained housing market, an individual's housing
choice would be driven by these variables. Identical individuals would make identical housing choices and any empirical relation-
ship between housing and life satisfaction could be an indirect effect of some missing variable.
However, the housing market in China is a constrained market. Individuals face signiﬁcant restrictions on the types of dwelling
that are available to them. Thus, two individuals who are otherwise identical in all aspects may end up with different housing
choices due to exogenous factors that are beyond their control and that are otherwise unrelated to life satisfaction. Our approach
utilises this exogenous ‘randomness’ in housing allocations in China to consider the importance of housing for life satisfaction.
Owning a house potentially provides both personal and social beneﬁts relative to renting. For example, renting provides less
security of tenure for tenants than if the tenants owned their own home and this may reduce incentives to invest in the local
community (see e.g. Hu, 2013; Ruprah, 2010). We would expect that these beneﬁts of home ownership would be reﬂected in
an individual's assessment of their subjective wellbeing.
However, there are also arguments suggesting a negative relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing. One
important reason could relate to ﬁnancial capacity. If a household has a home loan, then this may create potential ﬁnancial stress.
An adverse event, such as the loss of employment by one member of a household or an accident requiring expensive health care,
may have a greater negative impact on a homeowner with a loan than on either a homeowner without a loan or a renter. Another
important reason could relate to mobility. Home ownership might reduce one's ﬂexibility and mobility, lowering subjective
wellbeing. Low-income households, in particular, might be forced to take out large mortgages to purchase in distressed
neighbourhoods on the city fringes or outer suburbs (‘the mortgage belt’) and be locked into their locale because of negative
equity in their home. This will be particularly problematic if there are declining jobs in the area and the individual is forced to
travel long distances for work. This was a common phenomenon in many countries in the fallout from the Global Financial Crisis,
contributing to lower subjective wellbeing (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2011).3
If future uncertainty, such as ﬁnancial uncertainty and uncertainty over other ‘life events’, impact the relative subjective
wellbeing of homeowners and renters, this should also be reﬂected in different wellbeing for other types of home ownership
in China, such as partial and minor property rights.
To capture the relationship between uncertainty, home ownership and life satisfaction, we need to consider both the existence
of home loans and an individual's expectations about the future. We denote the existence of a loan for individual i by the dummy
variable Li where Li = 1 if the individual has a home loan and Li = 0 otherwise.4
For uncertainty and risk, let S denote the set of potential future states of the world for an individual, and divide S into two subsets
so S=S1∪S2. The set S1 are those states where there is either no stress on the individual or the level of stress is not sufﬁcient to im-
pinge on the individual's housing decision. The set S2 are those states of the world where the individual faces negative events that do
potentially impinge on their home ownership. For example, S2will include those situationswhere the individual faces ﬁnancial stress.
If the individual is a renter then this stress may force them to move and ‘downgrade’ their accommodation. If the individual is a
homeowner, the stress may force them to sell their house and move to different accommodation.
Let πj be the probability that a state in Sj, j = 1,2, arises where π1+π2=1. Let ui(xi;Li,Sj) be the (expected) utility of individual
i in the set of states Sj given their ownership status xi and their loan status Li. We would expect:3 Also
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Politui xi;0; S1ð Þ≈ ui xi;1; S1ð Þ N ui xi;0; S2ð Þ ≥ ui xi;1; S1ð Þ:In other words, an individual or household will have higher utility when not facing ﬁnancial or other stress than when they
are facing such stress. Further, if an individual is facing stress, having a housing loan can only exacerbate that stress and lower
their utility.5 In states S1 where there is no relevant stress, we would expect:ui f ; Li; S1ð Þ N ui p; Li; S1ð Þ N ui m; Li; S1ð Þ N ui 0;0; S1ð Þ:see Chadi (2015) for a discussion on the relationship between the Euro crisis and happiness.
rly for renters, xi = 0 and Li = 0.
ing a home loan may or may not lower subjective wellbeing signiﬁcantly in those situations where the individual or household does not face stress. Hence we
r individual subjective wellbeing in states S1 to be approximately invariant with regards to loan status.
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Politui f ;0; S2ð Þ N ui p;0; S2ð Þ N ui m;0; S2ð Þ N ui 0;0; S2ð Þ:This again reﬂects the beneﬁts of security of property rights and (potentially) liquidity under different forms of ownership
when facing stress. Further, it reﬂects that, in the absence of a home loan, a homeowner is likely to face increased security relative
to a renter. Stress may make it difﬁcult for a renter to meet ﬁnancial obligations (including rent) that can be met or deferred by a
homeowner without a home loan. Thus, a renter has a greater risk of moving and losing location speciﬁc sunk capital in situations
of stress relative to a homeowner who does not have a home loan.
In contrast, in states S2, if the homeowner does have a home loan, we would expect this to raise the risk of a forced sale of the
home. Again, we would expect:ui f ;1; S2ð Þ N ui p;1; S2ð Þ N ui m;1; S2ð Þ:This reﬂects that homeowners with full property rights have greater liquidity to sell their property relative to homeowners
with partial property rights. And partial property rights, in turn, are more secure and liquid than minor property rights.
It is not clear, however, whether a renter (who does not have a home loan) would be better off than some or all homeowners
in this situation. For example, it is possible that ui(0;0,S2)Nui(m;1,S2), reﬂecting that a home owner with minor property rights
and a home loan might gain lower utility than a renter who is relatively more ﬂexible in this situation.
Given these state-contingent levels of utility, an individual's current subjective wellbeing may be represented by the expected
utility over future events. Denoting subjective wellbeing by Ui(xi,Li), we have:Ui xi; Lið Þ ¼ π1ui xi; Li; S1ð Þ þ π2ui xi; Li; S2ð Þ:It follows that6:
• Regardless of whether or not a homeowner has a home loan, we expect subjective wellbeing to rise the more secure and liquid
are the individual's property rights over their home. Thus, given their loan status, individuals with full property rights will have
higher subjective wellbeing than individuals with partial property rights, which, in turn, will be higher than individuals with
minor property rights.
• Given an individual's home ownership status, subjective wellbeing will be higher for an individual without a home loan than an
individual with a home loan.
• An individual who rents will have lower subjective wellbeing than a homeowner unless there is a signiﬁcant risk of an adverse
future event. If this risk is signiﬁcant, a renter may have higher subjective wellbeing than a homeowner with a home loan,
particularly if the homeowner has minor property rights.
3. Data
Themain dataset used in this studywas collected in 2011 through the CHFS administrated by Southwestern University of Finance
and Economics in China. The 2011 CHFS employed a stratiﬁed three-stage probability proportion to size (PPS) random sample design.
The ﬁrst stage selected 80 counties (including county-level cities and districts) from 2585 counties (primary sampling units, or PSUs)
from all provinces and municipalities in mainland China except Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. The second stage selected four
neighbourhood committees/villages from each of the selected PSUs at the ﬁrst stage. The third stage selected 20–50 households
(depending on the level of urbanization and economic development) from each of the neighbourhood committees/villages chosen
at the previous stage. Every stage of sampling was carried out with the PPS method and weighted by population size.
The 2011 CHFS collected information from 8438 households from rural and urban areas. In this study, we used a sample of
5229 urban respondents who provided information pertaining to housing, subjective wellbeing and other key variables used in
this study. Subjective wellbeing was measured by responses to the question: Overall, are you satisﬁed with your life? Responses
were measured on a ﬁve-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very dissatisﬁed to 5 = very satisﬁed. The survey contained various
questions relating to home ownership, source of ownership, mortgage status, type of loan, housing tenure and housing conditions.
The CHFS also collected data on the usual control variables that previous studies suggest are correlated with subjective wellbeing,
such as human capital and political capital which are likely to have signiﬁcant effects on the access of urban Chinese to
homeownership (Liu and Mao, 2012).
Table 1 shows life satisfaction for homeowners and non-homeowners who do not have any one of the three types of home
ownership (full, partial or minor). The mean life satisfaction of homeowners is consistently higher than non-homeowners.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on all variables used in the study.7 Just under half the sample were male, 84.93% were mar-
ried and 19% were members of the Chinese Communist Party. The average years of schooling were 10.34 years and the averagerly to go from individual results to population results we need to control for differences in subjective expectations. We do this by including a range of expec-
ariables, such as property price expectations and expectations of future interest rates, in our empirical analysis.
variables are described in detail in the appendix.
e cite this article as: Cheng, Z., et al., Housing property rights and subjective wellbeing in urban China, European Journal of
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics, 2011 China Household Finance Survey.
Variable Mean or percentage
Life satisfaction (very dissatisﬁed = 1, dissatisﬁed = 2, neutral = 3, satisﬁed = 4, very satisﬁed = 5) 3.72
Homeownership (%) 87.70
Full homeownership (%) 72.00
Partial homeownership (%) 5.71
Minor homeownership (%) 3.13
No homeownership (%) 19.16
Number of full homeownership 0.85
Number of partial homeownership 0.06
Number of minor homeownership 0.04
Informal home loan (%) 12.36
Formal home loan (%) 9.71
Housing provident fund loan (%) 2.49
Commercial bank loan (%) 6.63
Portfolio loan (a combination of housing provident fund and commercial bank loans) (%) 0.47
Ln remaining informal home loan 0.13
Ln remaining formal home loan 0.24
Purchased discounted property (%) 12.45
Ln property value per square meter 0.31
Propety tenure longer than 15 years (%) 38.88
Male (%) 49.25
Age (years) 48.20
Married (%) 84.79
Education (years) 10.57
Number of social insurance schemes 1.60
Chinese Communist Party member (%) 19.06
Ln household income per capita (RMB/month in 2011) 9.32
Rural-urban migrant (%) 29.94
Household size 3.23
Local public safety (very poor = 1, very good = 5) 3.44
Risk aversion (highest = 1, lowest = 5) 3.77
Economy expectation (very poor = 1, very good = 5) 3.79
Property price expectation (decreases a lot = 1, increases a lot = 5) 3.79
Commodity price expectation (decreases a lot = 1, increases a lot = 5) 4.15
Interest rate expectation (decreases a lot = 1, increases a lot = 5) 3.78
Ln vehicle value 2.00
Ln bank deposit 6.24
Ln share and fund value 0.37
Work unit (six types) See Appendix T1
Employment relation (four types) See Appendix T1
Occupation (seven types) See Appendix T1
Industry (21 types) See Appendix T1
Province (21 province) See Appendix T1
Table 1
Life satisfaction by homeownership in urban China, 2011 China Household Finance Survey.
Mean Std. dev. Very dissatisﬁed (%) Dissatisﬁed (%) Neutral (%) Satisﬁed (%) Very satisﬁed (%)
Homeownership (N = 4514) 3.75 0.80 0.73 4.24 30.03 49.04 15.96
No homeownership (N = 633) 3.50 0.89 2.22 8.54 37.97 39.24 12.03
5Z. Cheng et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxmonthly income was 1358 RMB. We have variables measuring household wealth (bank deposits, share and fund value and vehicle
value), migration status, work unit (danwei), employment relations (bianzhi), occupation, industry and province in which the
respondent resides. We also have a number of proxies for the respondent's personality in the form of variables measuring
expectations about the future and attitudes to risk.
Overall, 87.74% of the sample owned homes (i.e. owned a home outright or with a mortgage). Just over 70% of the sample
owned one property, while 16.17% owned more than one property. The average number of properties owned was 1.07. CHFS
asked questions distinguishing between full ownership, partial ownership and minor ownership. About 70% of the sample had
full ownership rights, 16.17% had partial property rights and 7.21% had minor property rights.
Just under 10% of the sample had a formal home loan and 12.36% had an informal loan (consisting mainly of borrowing from
friends and relatives). Of those with a formal home loan, 92.67% had a commercial bank loan, 1.87% had a housing provident fund
loan and 5.46% had a portfolio loan.8 Other property-related variables included house tenure longer than 15 years (38.8% had8 A portfolio loan is a combination of commercial loans provided to the borrower to make up the shortfall in case the housing provident fund loan applied for is not
sufﬁcient to pay the house price.
Please cite this article as: Cheng, Z., et al., Housing property rights and subjective wellbeing in urban China, European Journal of
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spondent had purchased the property at a discount from their danwei (work unit) (12.45% had); whether the respondent thought
the property in which he/she lived had appreciated in value (85.35% considered it had) and whether the respondent expected
interest rates and property prices to increase.
4. The empirical model
We estimate the following empirical function:9 The
Pleas
PolitLSi ¼ F Xi;Hi; εi
  ð1Þwhere LS is life satisfaction for the ith respondent; X is a vector of personal and provincial characteristics; H is a vector of housing-
related characteristics; and ε is the error term. There are different methods to treat subjective wellbeing indicators. In a method-
ological paper, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) suggest that results are not sensitive to the choice of ordinary least squares
(OLS), that treats subjective wellbeing variables as cardinal, or ordered probit/logit methods that treats them as ordinal. On the-
oretical grounds, Ng (1997) advocates treating subjective wellbeing as cardinal. In the main results we do so and use OLS; how-
ever, in the robust checks, presented later in the paper, we also present results in which we treat subjective wellbeing as being
ordinal.
Our main results that we report below are OLS estimates for the CHFS data. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) ﬁnd that the
determinants of subjective wellbeing are sensitive to standardization for individual ﬁxed effects in datasets, which lack variables
controlling for personality. Standardization tends to reduce the size of positive coefﬁcients on income because having a personal-
ity, which is conducive to higher subjective wellbeing, is also associated with having a higher income. This ﬁnding implies that we
should instrument for income and control for personality.
We control for personality by including variables measuring a range of expectations about the future and attitudes to risk.
Previous research suggests that personality traits are correlated with expectations about the future (see e.g. Oettingen and
Mayer, 2002) and risk-taking behavior (see e.g. Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000). While our main variables of interest are
home ownership, housing property rights, whether the respondent has a loan and, if so, the type of loan, we attempt to minimize
potential omitted variables bias using a rich set of controls. Among others, these include various property attributes (house value,
house tenure and whether the house was purchased at a discount), various indicators of household wealth (value of bank
deposits, shares and vehicles), migration status and work-related variables, such as the respondent's work unit (danwei), employ-
ment relations (bianzhi), occupation and industry in which he/she works.
A potential problem with the OLS estimates is, as Knight et al. (2009) note, unobserved characteristics, such as personal
energy, might increase income and subjective wellbeing or higher subjective wellbeing might raise income through higher
productivity. Hence, income is endogenous. We attempt to address endogeneity of income in various ways.
The ﬁrst way is that we instrument for income using industry-occupation-province yearly household consumption expenditure
(excluding the respondent's household consumption expenditure) per capita in the year before the survey. This strategy combines
the approaches pursued by Luechinger (2009), Luttmer (2005) and Vendrik (2013) who instrument for income by using
predicted industry-occupation income and Gao and Smyth (2011) and Kingdon and Knight (2007), who instrument for income
by directly using consumption expenditure. Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) use a continuous variable representing the lagged
regional house price to instrument for income on the assumption that high house prices act to raise wages in a region. Increases
in industry-occupation-province average monthly household consumption expenditure (excluding the respondent's household
consumption expenditure) in the year preceding the survey likely reﬂect industry, occupation and province-wide factors, but
not exceptional personal effort by any household member (see Vendrik, 2013). In addition, as Kingdon and Knight (2007, p.86)
put it: “Expenditure seems to be a reasonable instrument for income since it is unlikely that measurement error in per capita in-
come will be correlated with measurement error in per capita expenditure”. In terms of the exclusion restriction, one would not
expect the respondent's life satisfaction to depend on the industry-occupation-province average monthly household consumption
expenditure in the previous year.
Vendrik (2013) notes there might be a problem if the instrument is picking up life satisfaction effects associated with occupa-
tion or industry choice. This problem stems from people changing jobs not only to raise earnings, but for non-monetary beneﬁts
and other unobservable factors that make them happier. We largely address this concern through inclusion of a wide range of
work-related variables, including work unit, employment relation, occupation and industry dummies, as well as indicators of
non-monetary work-related beneﬁts, such as the number of social insurances. However, we cannot be completely certain that
our instrument satisﬁes the exclusion restriction.
Hence, the second way we instrument for income is using the methodology recently proposed by Lewbel (2012), which is an
identiﬁcation strategy that does not rely on external instruments, but rather, constructs an internal instrumental variable based on
the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data. Both Lewbel (2012) and the subsequent literature that has applied it, argues that itre is no evidence of multicolliearity between property tenure and sources of homeownership.
e cite this article as: Cheng, Z., et al., Housing property rights and subjective wellbeing in urban China, European Journal of
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PolitY1 ¼ XIβ1 þ Y2ϒ1 þ ξ1 ξ1 ¼ α1U þ V1 ð2ÞY2 ¼ XIβ2 þ ξ2 ξ2 ¼ α2U þ V2 ð3ÞLet Y1 be subjective wellbeing and Y2 be income. U denotes the individual's unobserved characteristics which affect both his/her
subjective wellbeing and income. V1 and V2 are idiosyncratic errors. Lewbel (2012) suggests that one can take a vector Z of observed
exogenous variables and use [Z− E(Z)]ξ2 as an instrument if:E X ξ1ð Þ ¼ 0; E X ξ2ð Þ ¼ 0; cov Z; ξ1;ξ2
 
¼ 0 ð4Þand there is some heteroskedasticity in ξj. Z could either be a subset of X or equal to X. The basis for using [Z − E(Z)]ξ2 as an
instrument is that identiﬁcation is achieved by having regressors that are not correlated with the product of the heteroskedastic
errors. As ξ2 is a population parameter, in practice the sample estimate ê2, obtained from the ﬁrst stage regression, is used. Hence
we use the vector [Z − E(Z)]ê2 as instruments.
It is important to note the assumptions underpinning the Lewbel (2012) approach. Each of the assumptions speciﬁed in
Eq. (4), are based on population parameters and, as such, are non testable. This is not unique to Lewbel (2012), though, and
does not present any major issues in practice because most of the assumptions are standard. Lewbel (2012, pp. 69) states:
“These are all standard assumptions, except that one usually either imposes homoscedasticity or allows for heteroskedasticity,
rather than requiring heteroskedasticity”. This means therefore, the only nonstandard required assumption by Lewbel (2012) is
that heteroskedasticity exists in ξj.
The exact form of heteroskedasticity requirement as derived in Lewbel (2012) is cov(Z, ξ22) ≠ 0, although to approximate this,
Lewbel (2012) suggests using the estimate of the sample covariance between Z and squared residuals from the ﬁrst stage regres-
sion linear regression on X to test for this requirement, using the Breusch and Pagan test for heteroskedasticity. This is summa-
rized by Lewbel (2012, p.71) as follows: “… if cov(Z, ξ22) is close to or equal to zero, then [Z − E(Z)]ξ2 will be a weak or useless
instrument, and this problem will be evident in the form of imprecise estimates with large standard errors”. One can test for this
using the Breusch and Pagan test for heteroskedasticity.
As an alternative to instrumenting for income we use matching estimates of the average treatment effect of home ownership on
life satisfaction. We ﬁrst use coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus et al., 2012) to pre-process the data, such that samples with
homeownership are only compared with samples without homeownership from the same province (see e.g. Cheng and Smyth,
2015a; Bateson, 2012). This is to ensure that the effect of home ownership on life satisfaction is net of the impacts of general differ-
ences between provinces. OLS is then applied to a matched sample to reduce variation in estimates (Ho et al., 2007). As a further ro-
bustness check, we apply propensity score matching (PSM), on the standard conditional independence assumption that, conditional
on a set of variables, the treatment variable is independent of potential outcomes (King et al., 2014).10 In China PSM has been used to
estimate the average treatment effect of home ownership on marriage and divorce (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2014).
As a ﬁnal robustness check on the results from the CHFS, we provide ﬁxed effects estimates using two alternative, nationally
representative datasets; namely, CHNS for the period 2009–2011 and CFPS for the period 2010–2012.11 The advantage of these
datasets is that we can better take account of ﬁxed individual traits than with CHFS. The disadvantage is that neither the
CHNS, nor the CFPS, contain as richer set of housing variables or control variables as the CHFS. The CHNS contains data on wheth-
er the respondent is a homeowner and has a home loan as well as house value and individual and household characteristics. The
CFPS contains data on the same key variables as the CHNS, plus full and partial ownership, but does not contain data on minor
ownership.
5. Results
The main results, estimated using OLS with cluster-robust standard errors to take into account household correlation, are pre-
sented in Table 3. In Column (1) we examine the relationship between home ownership, having a home loan and subjective
wellbeing, controlling for individual and household characteristics. In Column (2) we examine the relationship between different
property rights, having a home loan and subjective wellbeing, controlling for individual and household characteristics. The spec-
iﬁcation in Column (3) is similar to that in Column (2), except that we examine the number of full, partial and minor ownership
properties the respondent has. The speciﬁcations in Columns (4) and (5) consider different types of housing property rights,rder to predict the probability of being homeowners for the PSMestimates,we use the same set of personal, household, institutional, employment and province
s as in the OLS analysis (see the control variables in Table 3 below). This is in linewith existing literature on predictors of home ownership in urban China (see
2016; Wang and Otsuki, 2015). The logit regression results for the probability of being home owners are available from the authors.
CHNS data was collected by Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and Health at
ese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (see http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china). The CFPS data was collected by the Institute of Social Science Sur-
eking University (see http://www.isss.edu.cn/cfps).
e cite this article as: Cheng, Z., et al., Housing property rights and subjective wellbeing in urban China, European Journal of
ical Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.002
Table 3
Determinants of life satisfaction, 2011 China Household Finance Survey (OLS results).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Homeownership
Homeownership 0.224⁎⁎⁎ (5.59)
Full homeownership 0.174⁎⁎⁎ (3.21) 0.179⁎⁎ (2.77) 0.177⁎⁎ (2.78)
Partial homeownership 0.150⁎⁎ (2.77) 0.135⁎⁎ (2.24) 0.133⁎⁎ (2.25)
Minor homeownership 0.109⁎ (1.84) 0.0811⁎ (1.80) 0.0693⁎ (1.68)
Number of full homeownership 0.152⁎⁎⁎ (3.72)
Number of partial
homeownership
0.126⁎⁎⁎ (2.84)
Number of minor
homeownership
0.115⁎ (1.79)
Home loan
Informal home loan −0.0855⁎ (−1.87) −0.0829⁎ (−1.85) −0.0869⁎ (−1.96) −0.0731⁎ (−1.68)
Formal home loan 0.0312 (0.77) 0.0320 (0.84) 0.0193 (0.51)
Housing provident fund loan 0.196⁎⁎⁎ (3.05)
Commercial bank loan 0.00224 (0.05)
Portfolio loan −0.383⁎⁎ (−2.48)
Ln remaining informal home loan −0.0114 (−0.39)
Ln remaining formal home loan −0.000939 (−0.06)
Other property attributes
Purchased discounted property 0.0312 (0.82) 0.0335 (0.88)
Ln value per square meter 0.150⁎⁎⁎ (3.79) 0.147⁎⁎⁎ (3.26)
House tenure N15 years −0.00419⁎⁎⁎ (−3.01) −0.00396⁎⁎ (−2.65)
Control variables
Male −0.0675⁎⁎ (−2.25) −0.0660⁎⁎ (−2.15) −0.0672⁎⁎ (−2.22) −0.0757⁎⁎ (−2.31) −0.0756⁎⁎ (−2.33)
Age −0.0461⁎⁎⁎ (−8.00) −0.0447⁎⁎⁎ (−7.56) −0.0452⁎⁎⁎ (−7.75) −0.0438⁎⁎⁎ (−8.44) −0.0444⁎⁎⁎ (−8.80)
Age2/100 0.0496⁎⁎⁎ (9.44) 0.0485⁎⁎⁎ (8.92) 0.0490⁎⁎⁎ (9.16) 0.0468⁎⁎⁎ (9.63) 0.0473⁎⁎⁎ (10.05)
Married 0.314⁎⁎⁎ (11.43) 0.316⁎⁎⁎ (11.81) 0.322⁎⁎⁎ (11.93) 0.282⁎⁎⁎ (9.49) 0.281⁎⁎⁎ (9.47)
Education 0.00515 (1.35) 0.00432 (1.10) 0.00386 (0.98) 0.00446 (1.32) 0.00475 (1.36)
Number of social insurance 0.00871 (0.54) 0.00965 (0.60) 0.0108 (0.68) 0.0138 (1.04) 0.0159 (1.23)
China Communist Party member 0.0699⁎⁎ (2.24) 0.0685⁎⁎ (2.18) 0.0661⁎⁎ (2.11) 0.0318 (1.23) 0.0307 (1.25)
Ln household income per capita 0.0492⁎⁎⁎ (5.13) 0.0498⁎⁎⁎ (4.83) 0.0450⁎⁎⁎ (4.17) 0.0390⁎⁎⁎ (3.35) 0.0402⁎⁎⁎ (3.46)
Rural-urban migrants 0.0452 (1.12) 0.0634 (1.61) 0.0595 (1.52) 0.0763⁎⁎⁎ (3.06) 0.0727⁎⁎⁎ (3.01)
Household size 0.000500 (0.04) 0.00416 (0.33) 0.00164 (0.13) 0.0151 (1.61) 0.0153 (1.60)
Perceived better public safety 0.127⁎⁎⁎ (8.40) 0.127⁎⁎⁎ (8.55)
Express lower risk aversion −0.0178 (−1.71) −0.0170 (−1.64)
Expect better economy 0.165⁎⁎⁎ (12.02) 0.164⁎⁎⁎ (12.20)
Expect higher housing price −0.0324⁎⁎ (−2.63) −0.0316⁎⁎ (−2.46)
Expect higher commodity price 0.0225 (1.58) 0.0228 (1.61)
Expect higher interest rate 0.0244 (1.33) 0.0261 (1.40)
Ln vehicle value 0.00646⁎⁎⁎ (6.91) 0.00658⁎⁎⁎ (6.94)
Ln bank deposit 0.00251 (0.67) 0.00271 (0.74)
Ln share and fund value 0.0442⁎⁎ (2.38) 0.0449⁎⁎ (2.53)
Work unit No No Yes Yes Yes
Employment relation No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes
Province No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.707⁎⁎⁎ (17.55) 3.731⁎⁎⁎ (18.04) 3.803⁎⁎⁎ (18.77) 2.585⁎⁎⁎ (12.52) 2.573⁎⁎⁎ (12.50)
N 4850 4850 4850 4590 4590
adj. R2 0.059 0.057 0.058 0.141 0.138
Notes: t statistics clustered at household level in parentheses.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
8 Z. Cheng et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxdifferent types of loans, other attributes of the house including value, individual and household characteristics, controls for per-
sonality and household wealth. The most complete speciﬁcations, in Columns (4) and (5) also control for the respondent's
work unit (danwei), employment relations (bianzhi), occupation, industry and province in which the respondent resides.
The main ﬁnding in Column (1) is that the coefﬁcient on the dummy variable for home ownership is positive and signiﬁcant
and that the life satisfaction of homeowners is 0.22 points higher than non-homeowners. This result is consistent with the general
predictions of the conceptual model in Section 2, abstracting from the nuances of alternative forms of property rights. The main
ﬁnding in Columns (2), (4) and (5) is that the coefﬁcients on full ownership, partial ownership and minor ownership are positive
and signiﬁcant. Consistent with the predictions of the conceptual model in Section 2, in each case the coefﬁcient on full ownership
is larger than that on partial ownership and that the coefﬁcient on partial ownership is larger than that on minor ownership.
Similarly, in Column (2), the coefﬁcients on the number of full, partial and minor ownership properties are positive and signiﬁcantPlease cite this article as: Cheng, Z., et al., Housing property rights and subjective wellbeing in urban China, European Journal of
Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.002
Table 4
Matching estimates of the average treatment effect of homeownership on life satisfaction, 2011 China Household Finance Survey.
(1) (2) (3)
OLS after coarsened exact
matching on province
Nearest neighbour matching with
exact matching on province
Propensity score matching
Homeownership 0.230⁎⁎⁎ (2.38) 0.197⁎⁎⁎ (3.03) 0.189⁎⁎⁎ (3.06)
Notes: t statistics for speciﬁcation 1 and z statistics for speciﬁcations 2 and 3 in parentheses;
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
9Z. Cheng et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxwith the ordering on the magnitude of the coefﬁcients corresponding to that predicted by the conceptual model. These results are
robust to the inclusion of controls for housing value and household wealth.
In the Chinese housing market, informal borrowing, such as that among friends and relatives is popular. This is reﬂected by the
fact that more people have an informal home loan (12.36) than a formal home loan (9.71%). In Columns (1) to (4) the coefﬁcient
on having an informal home loan is negative and signiﬁcant (although only at the 10% level). In Columns (1) to (3) the coefﬁcient
on having a formal loan is insigniﬁcant. Column (4) considers the speciﬁc form of formal loan on subjective wellbeing. We ﬁnd
that the coefﬁcient on having a housing provident fund loan is positive, the coefﬁcient on having a commercial bank loan is in-
signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcient on having a portfolio loan is negative and signiﬁcant. The positive coefﬁcient on having a housing
provident fund loan reﬂects the beneﬁts that home buyers (mostly public, state and foreign-invested sector employees) receive
from such loans, which is equivalent to about a 10% saving on the interest payment, compared to a commercial loan for a typical
home purchase (Zheng and Chen, 2009).
The negative coefﬁcient on having a portfolio loan reﬂects the following. First, the down payment and overall interest rate for
a portfolio loan tend to be higher. With a portfolio loan the housing provident fund loan proportion has a lower interest rate than
a normal commercial loan. However, with a portfolio loan the commercial loan portion has a higher interest rate than a pure nor-
mal commercial bank loan. If the mortgagee has a pure commercial loan, the potential interest rate increase is capped at as low as
3%, but if the buyer chooses a portfolio loan, the potential interest rate increase of the commercial loan portion is capped at as
high as 30%. At the same time, the down payment with a portfolio loan (as high as 60%) is higher than with a commercial
loan (usually 30%). Chen and Deng (2014, p. 946) state “except in the early years, the interest rate on housing provident fund
home loans does not have much advantage compared to that of commercial-bank lending. Usually, the interest rate gap is around
2 percentage points. But if commercial-bank mortgages with preferential terms are available, the gap will be smaller”. Thus, with a
portfolio loan, the beneﬁts of a slightly lower interest rate from the housing provident fund loan component is likely to be offset
by the higher interest rate on the commercial loan component and higher down payment (Pan and Yang, 2013).
Second, some developers restrict the choice of home loan providers for a portfolio loan. This means that buyers can only
choose banks that charge a higher interest rate for portfolio loans. Third, the administrative burden associated with getting ap-
proval for a portfolio loan is higher. For instance, mortgagees applying for, and repaying, portfolio loans, need to prepare more
documents and sign two contracts because they are dealing with both commercial banks and government agencies. It also
takes a longer time (usually several months to half a year) to get approval compared to the other two types of loans (which usu-
ally take one or two weeks). Some real estate developers do not accept portfolio loans because the procedure is complicated and
it takes them longer to receive payment from the banks and government agencies. For example, it was reported that in Beijing
only three out of ten real estate developers were willing to accept portfolio loans (Zhang and Li, 2008). The situation improved
immediately after the Global Financial Crisis, but has deteriorated in recent years because of the heated housing market. For
instance, in Guangzhou a developer provided a 7% discount to commercial loan mortgagees, but no discount to portfolio loan
mortgagees; and another developer asked purchasers to pay additional fees, equivalent to 4% of the house price (Ou, 2013).
The results for individual characteristics and expectations variables are largely as expected and mostly consistent with previ-
ous studies (see Dolan et al., 2008). The coefﬁcient on household income per capita is positive and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
The coefﬁcients on vehicle value and share value are positive and signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on house value is positive and
signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on being in the property N15 years is negative, but the coefﬁcient is small.6. Extensions and robustness checks
While various ﬁxed effects are controlled for in the speciﬁcations in Table 3, one concern is that subjective wellbeing may also
be correlated with provincial effects that are associated with, inter alia, differential housing policies, which could exert an inde-
pendent impact, or sorting effect, on subjective wellbeing. To address this issue, we ﬁrst re-estimated all speciﬁcations in
Table 3 for each province and the results were qualitatively similar across provinces.12 We also rerun the speciﬁcation in Column
(1) in Table 3 after CEM through which respondents with homeownership are compared with respondents without
homeownership from the same province. The results are reported in Column (1) in Table 4. The coefﬁcient for homeownership
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. We also use nearest neighbour matching with exact matches at the province level and12 Results for all 22 provinces are available from the authors.
Please cite this article as: Cheng, Z., et al., Housing property rights and subjective wellbeing in urban China, European Journal of
Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.002
Table 5
Robustness checks, 2011 China Household Finance Survey.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Two-level
mixed-effects linear
regression with China
Marketization Index at
the provincial
random-effect level
TSLS regression with
mean consumption as
IV
TSLS regression with
(z−zÞϵ2 as IV
OLS regression
without property
tenure
Ordered probit
regression
Ordered probit
regression with mean
consumption as IV
Homeownership
Full homeownership 0.191⁎⁎ (2.11) 0.172⁎⁎ (2.55) 0.167⁎⁎⁎ (2.92) 0.167⁎⁎ (2.52) 0.233⁎⁎ (2.72) 0.231⁎⁎ (2.74)
Partial homeownership 0.141⁎⁎ (2.45) 0.141⁎⁎ (2.27) 0.126⁎⁎ (2.39) 0.126⁎ (2.06) 0.204⁎⁎ (2.30) 0.212⁎⁎ (2.57)
Minor homeownership 0.0937⁎ (1.94) 0.0608⁎ (1.73) 0.0767⁎ (1.83) 0.0769⁎ (1.76) 0.128⁎ (1.86) 0.113⁎ (1.79)
Home loan
Informal home loan −0.0759⁎ (−1.76) −0.0283⁎ (−1.69) −0.0587⁎ (−1.79) −0.0588⁎ (−1.96) −0.103⁎ (−1.93) −0.107⁎ (−1.67)
Housing provident fund loan 0.194⁎⁎⁎ (3.06) 0.155⁎⁎ (2.54) 0.206⁎⁎⁎ (2.92) 0.206⁎⁎⁎ (3.28) 0.304⁎⁎⁎ (2.97) 0.278⁎⁎⁎ (2.61)
Commercial bank loan 0.00516 (0.11) −0.0322 (−0.62) 0.0146 (0.32) 0.0145 (0.30) 0.00722 (0.10) 0.0145 (0.22)
Portfolio loan −0.389⁎⁎ (−2.54) −0.434⁎⁎⁎ (−2.92) −0.371⁎⁎ (−2.38) −0.371⁎⁎ (−2.39) −0.551⁎⁎ (−2.56) −0.553⁎⁎ (−2.58)
Other house attributes
Purchased discounted house 0.0349 (0.95) 0.00162 (0.04) 0.0188 (0.52) 0.0188 (0.50) 0.0424 (0.74) 0.0359 (0.63)
Ln value per square meter 0.117⁎⁎⁎ (3.65) 0.0939⁎⁎ (2.44) 0.154⁎⁎⁎ (3.46) 0.154⁎⁎⁎ (3.87) 0.228⁎⁎⁎ (4.01) 0.237⁎⁎⁎ (3.96)
House tenure N15 years −0.00415⁎⁎⁎ (−3.10) −0.00403⁎⁎ (−2.51) −0.00226⁎⁎ (2.02) −0.00627⁎⁎⁎ (−3.17) −0.00654⁎⁎⁎ (−3.23)
Control variables
Male −0.0759⁎⁎ (−2.33) −0.0669⁎⁎ (−2.07) −0.0751⁎⁎⁎ (−3.17) −0.0751⁎⁎ (−2.32) −0.111⁎⁎ (−2.25) −0.109⁎⁎ (−2.24)
Age −0.0432⁎⁎⁎ (−8.16) −0.0398⁎⁎⁎ (−8.75) −0.0445⁎⁎⁎ (−9.11) −0.0445⁎⁎⁎ (−8.63) −0.0668⁎⁎⁎ (−8.29) −0.0657⁎⁎⁎ (−8.04)
Age2/100 0.0463⁎⁎⁎ (9.31) 0.0413⁎⁎⁎ (9.70) 0.0471⁎⁎⁎ (10.00) 0.0471⁎⁎⁎ (9.67) 0.0716⁎⁎⁎ (9.35) 0.0708⁎⁎⁎ (9.15)
Married 0.285⁎⁎⁎ (9.67) 0.255⁎⁎⁎ (8.06) 0.286⁎⁎⁎ (8.31) 0.286⁎⁎⁎ (9.76) 0.408⁎⁎⁎ (9.28) 0.410⁎⁎⁎ (9.28)
Education 0.00426 (1.25) −0.00545 (−1.33) 0.00449 (1.10) 0.00449 (1.30) 0.00622 (1.22) 0.00661 (1.30)
Number of social insurance 0.0134 (1.01) 0.0230⁎ (1.84) 0.0134 (1.12) 0.0134 (1.02) 0.0176 (0.92) 0.0162 (0.84)
China Communist Party member 0.0320 (1.24) −0.00299 (−0.13) 0.0352 (1.11) 0.0351 (1.37) 0.0481 (1.28) 0.0413 (1.14)
Ln household income per capita 0.0368⁎⁎⁎ (3.23) 0.0572⁎⁎⁎ (4.44) 0.0491⁎⁎⁎ (3.78) 0.0391⁎⁎⁎ (3.39) 0.0563⁎⁎⁎ (3.19) 0.0761⁎⁎⁎ (3.17)
Rural-urban migrants 0.0754⁎⁎⁎ (3.01) 0.0722⁎⁎ (2.46) 0.0698⁎⁎ (2.31) 0.0698⁎⁎ (2.72) 0.105⁎⁎⁎ (2.91) 0.105⁎⁎⁎ (2.91)
Household size 0.0144 (1.58) 0.0559⁎⁎⁎ (5.08) 0.0138 (1.47) 0.0138 (1.45) 0.0219 (1.61) 0.0219 (1.61)
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Perceived better public safety 0.127⁎⁎⁎ (8.78) 0.128⁎⁎⁎ (8.79) 0.127⁎⁎⁎ (9.68) 0.127⁎⁎⁎ (8.43) 0.192⁎⁎⁎ (8.97) 0.192⁎⁎⁎ (8.82)
Express lower risk aversion −0.0180⁎ (−1.77) −0.00560 (−0.47) −0.0177⁎ (−1.80) −0.0177 (−1.71) −0.0257⁎ (−1.65) −0.0280⁎ (−1.80)
Expect better economy 0.167⁎⁎⁎ (12.54) 0.155⁎⁎⁎ (10.77) 0.165⁎⁎⁎ (12.24) 0.165⁎⁎⁎ (12.09) 0.244⁎⁎⁎ (11.71) 0.245⁎⁎⁎ (11.84)
Expect higher housing price −0.0304⁎⁎ (−2.45) −0.0256⁎⁎ (−2.03) −0.0324⁎⁎ (−2.44) −0.0324⁎⁎ (−2.60) −0.0497⁎⁎⁎ (−2.74) −0.0478⁎⁎⁎ (−2.61)
Expect higher commodity price 0.0212 (1.50) 0.0231⁎ (1.68) 0.0217 (1.47) 0.0217 (1.53) 0.0357⁎ (1.74) 0.0343⁎ (1.65)
Expect higher interest rate 0.0251 (1.38) 0.0179 (1.13) 0.0256 (1.54) 0.0255 (1.37) 0.0354 (1.32) 0.0358 (1.39)
Ln vehicle value 0.00649⁎⁎⁎ (7.23) 0.00208 (1.61) 0.00666⁎⁎⁎ (4.50) 0.00666⁎⁎⁎ (7.15) 0.0100⁎⁎⁎ (6.21) 0.00916⁎⁎⁎ (4.97)
Ln bank deposit 0.00251 (0.69) −0.00669⁎ (−1.96) 0.00253 (0.91) 0.00253 (0.67) 0.00352 (0.65) 0.00366 (0.69)
Ln share and fund value 0.0435⁎⁎ (2.41) 0.0438⁎⁎ (2.28) 0.0446⁎⁎⁎ (2.87) 0.0446⁎⁎ (2.39) 0.0666⁎⁎ (2.38) 0.0645⁎⁎ (2.34)
Work unit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment relation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.769⁎⁎⁎ (13.24) 0.616 (1.10) 2.600⁎⁎⁎ (12.91) 2.600⁎⁎⁎ (12.72)
Cut 1 −1.042⁎⁎⁎ (−3.32) −1.005⁎⁎⁎ (−3.25)
Cut 2 −0.131 (−0.43) −0.0949 (−0.32)
Cut 3 1.250⁎⁎⁎ (4.11) −0.0949 (−0.32)
Cut 4 2.786⁎⁎⁎ (9.36) −0.0949 (−0.32)
Level 2 – Province random effect
China Marketization Index (variance) 0.000235 (0.15)
Constant (variance) 0.00767 (0.64)
Residual (variance) 0.0391 (0.78)
Tests of endogeneity Robust regression F (Ho: variables are
exogenous)
17.671⁎⁎⁎
First-stage regression robust F 96.75⁎⁎⁎ 16.88⁎⁎⁎
N 4590 4590 4590 4590 4590 4590
Notes: t statistics in parentheses for OLS; z statistics in parentheses for TSLS and probit regressions.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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Table 6
Homeownership and life satisfaction, 2009–2011 China Health and Nutrition Survey.
OLS Fixed effects
Homeownership 0.325⁎⁎⁎ (8.40) 0.102⁎⁎⁎ (3.13)
Has home loan 0.172 (0.37) −0.115 (−0.98)
Ln house value per square meter 0.0481⁎⁎⁎ (4.53) 0.0375⁎⁎ (2.10)
Control variables Yes Yes
N 5769 4490
Notes: t statistics in parentheses.
Life satisfaction is measured on a 5-point scale (from low to high; mean = 3.64; standard deviation = 0.86). The control variables for OLS are gender, age, age
squared, marital status, education, rural-urban migration status, household income per capita, household assets (values of vehicles, production equipment and
household appliances), occupation, type of work unit and province. Only urban samples are used.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
12 Z. Cheng et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxPSM of the probability of homeownership to estimate the average treatment effect of homeownership on happiness. The results
are in Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4. The results for home ownership are similar to those reported in Column (1) in Table 3.
In addition, in Column (1) in Table 5, we run a mixed-effects linear regression, which allows for random effects at the province
level. The results are similar to those in Column (4) in Table 3.13 In particular, the coefﬁcients on housing property rights are
positive and signiﬁcant and the magnitude of the coefﬁcients are as per predicted by the theoretical model. The coefﬁcients on
having a home loan and other housing attributes are also the same as in Table 3. The variation in provincial residual parameters
is insigniﬁcant and the interclass correlation between individual and provincial levels is only 1%. These results show that
provincial, or sorting effects, are not a major concern.
In Column (1) in Table 5 we also include the China Marketization Index (Fan et al., 2011). This variable potentially captures eco-
nomic freedom. Previous studies suggest that economic freedomhas a positive effect on subjectivewellbeing (see e.g. Gehring, 2013).
Ideally, we would like to have included the Chinese Marketization Index in Table 3 to consider how this institutional/policy variable
relates to property rights, loan availability and subjectivewell-being (see Bjornskov et al., 2010). However, the ChineseMarketization
Index (and similar indices) is province based, meaning it has the same effect as a province dummy, resulting in multicollinearity. In
the two-level mixed effects linear regression model in Column (1) in Table 5, we put the index in level-2 random effects, but it is
insigniﬁcant.
Columns (2) to (4) in Table 5 report results in we use alternative strategies to deal with endogeneity. In Column (2) we
instrument for income using industry-occupation-province monthly household consumption expenditure per capita in the year
before the survey. The results of the two-stage least squares regression for the full speciﬁcation with consumption as an instru-
ment are presented in Column (2). The result of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square endogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis
that income is exogenous. The result of an underidentiﬁcation test rejects the null hypothesis that consumption is not correlated
with income. The result of a weak identiﬁcation test did not reject the null hypothesis that consumption is strongly correlated
with income. The F-statistic against the null that the excluded instruments are irrelevant in the ﬁrst-stage regression is higher
than 10. In sum, our conventional external instrument is found to be a valid instrumental variable. The results with respect to
the housing property rights and loan variables as well as other house attributes are the same as in Colum (4) in Table 3. The
coefﬁcient on income is positive and signiﬁcant.
While we have attempted to show that consumption is a valid instrument for income, doubt may still linger about the
exclusion restriction, which cannot be tested directly. Hence, we report the Lewbel (2012) estimates in Column (3) of Table 5.
The Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null of constant variance. The results, in terms of sign and signiﬁcance for all of the housing
variables are identical to those in Column (4) in Table 3. The coefﬁcient on income continues to be positive and signiﬁcant.
Diaz-Serrano (2009) suggests that duration of residence might also be endogenous if people are more likely to move because
they are not satisﬁed with their housing arrangements. Diaz-Serrano (2009) addresses this issue by re-estimating the speciﬁcation
excluding duration of residence. We do likewise for the full speciﬁcation. The results are reported in Column (4) of Table 5. The
ﬁndings are almost identical to those reported in Column (4) of Table 3. In Columns (2) to (4), not only are the coefﬁcients on
housing property rights positive and signiﬁcant, but their magnitudes are consistent with the prediction of the conceptual
model in Section 2 in each case.
The results to this point treat subjective wellbeing as cardinal. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 5 treat subjective wellbeing as or-
dinal. The ordered logit results in Table 5 donot instrument for income so they are the ordinal equivalent of Column (4) in Table 3. The
sign and signiﬁcance of the variables in the ordered logit are almost the same as the OLS results in Column (4) of Table 3. The ﬁnal
column of Table 5 presents the ordered logit results in which we instrument for income using mean consumption. These results
are the ordinal equivalent of the two-stage least squares results presented in the second column of Table 5. The results are the
same with respect to the housing property rights variables loan variables, other house attributes and household income.13 For privacy and legal reasons, the CHFS data does not reveal detailed location information other than province. Thus, one cannot further control for more detailed
location random effects. A recent study on happiness in China shows that neighbourhood/sorting effects at lower administrative levels are not a major concern (Cheng
and Smyth, 2015a). The reason is that in urban China, housing allocation is not solely determined by a tight housingmarket, thus the effects of housing segregation and
neighbourhood stratiﬁcation, due to housing policies, are not as signiﬁcant as in Western countries.
Please cite this article as: Cheng, Z., et al., Housing property rights and subjective wellbeing in urban China, European Journal of
Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.002
Table 7
Homeownership and life satisfaction, 2010–2012 China Family Panel Studies.
OLS Fixed effects
Homeownership 0.153⁎⁎⁎ (9.31) 0.0671⁎⁎ (2.00)
Full homeownership 0.161⁎⁎⁎ (9.76) 0.0708⁎⁎ (2.38)
Partial homeownership 0.0609⁎⁎ (2.33) 0.0363⁎ (1.59)
Has home loan 0.0336 (1.23) 0.0311 (1.14) −0.0700 (−1.33) −0.0701 (−1.33)
Ln house value 0.0156⁎⁎⁎ (12.35) 0.0154⁎⁎⁎ (12.25) 0.00587⁎⁎ (2.57) 0.00589⁎⁎ (2.58)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 29,816 29,816 18,901 18,901
Notes: t statistics in parentheses.
Happiness is measured on a 5-point scale (from low to high; mean = 3.40; standard deviation = 1.04). The control variables for OLS are gender, age, age squared,
marital status, socioeconomic status, self-conﬁdence, education, Chinese Communist Party membership, rural-urban migration status, household size, household
income, household savings, household share and fund values, household debt, occupation, type of work unit and province. Only urban samples are used.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
13Z. Cheng et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxWhile we have used alternative strategies to address endogeneity and omitted variables bias with our CHFS dataset, given it is
cross-sectional we do not have variation over time. Hence, as additional robust checks we employ two alternative panel datasets;
namely, the CHNS for 2009 to 2011 and the CFPS for 2010 to 2012. The results for the CHNS are reported in Table 6. Home
ownership and house value are positively related to life satisfaction and having a home loan is statistically insigniﬁcant. The
results for CFPS are reported in Table 7. In alternative speciﬁcations, home ownership and having full and partial property rights
are positively related to life satisfaction. The coefﬁcient on full ownership is larger than on partial ownership consistent with the
conceptual model. House value is positively related with life satisfaction. Having a home loan is insigniﬁcant. We do not report the
results for the control variables in Tables 6 and 7, but they are consistent with expectations. The results from the panel datasets
are consistent with the ﬁndings from the CHFS for the variables that are also in the CHNS and CFPS.
7. Conclusion
There is now a large literature exploring the determinants of subjective wellbeing in China. Hu (2013), however, is the only study
in English that has focused on the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing in China. This study has contrib-
uted to further understanding the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing in China by presenting a theoret-
ical model linking housing property rights to subjectivewellbeing in China and empirically testing the theoretical predictions.We use
a more recent dataset than Hu (2013), allow for a greater range of ownership forms, not only consider whether homeowners have a
home loan, but also consider the source of the loan and control, inter alia, for house value and household wealth.
Ourmain ﬁndings are as follows: Home ownership is positively correlatedwith life satisfaction. Full ownership, partial ownership
andminor ownership are positively correlatedwith life satisfaction. The coefﬁcient on full ownership is larger than partial ownership,
which, in turn, is larger than minor ownership. Each of these results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. We
ﬁnd that having a formal home loan is statistically insigniﬁcant, but having an informal home loan from friends and relatives is neg-
atively related to life satisfaction, relative to those who own a home without such a loan. We observe heterogeneity across different
types of formal loans. Having a housing provident fund loan is positively related to life satisfaction, while having a portfolio loan is
negatively related to life satisfaction. We also ﬁnd that house value is positively related to life satisfaction while long house tenure
(N15 years) is negatively related to life satisfaction. A strength of ourﬁndings is that they are robust across a number of different spec-
iﬁcations, with different controls, and using a range of strategies to address endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity across time.
The results have important public policy implications. The ﬁrst is that subjective wellbeing can be increased by promoting
home ownership. The second stems from the heterogeneous nature of property rights and the ﬁnding that full ownership has
a stronger positive association with life satisfaction than partial property rights and that partial property rights, in turn, are
more strongly related with life satisfaction than minor property rights. This result suggests the government can improve subjec-
tive wellbeing by laying the ground rules for stronger housing property rights. This relates particularly to the strength of property
rights transferred when housing is purchased at subsidised prices from the government or enterprise (partial property rights) and
when new housing estates are developed for resettlements, in which minor property rights are common. Finally, while we ﬁnd
that having a formal home loan is not statistically related to subjective wellbeing, the ﬁnding that different types of formal
loans have a heterogeneous effect on subjective wellbeing has policy implications. In particular, subjective wellbeing could be
increased by reconsidering the nature of portfolio loans and the procedures to obtain them.
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14 Z. Cheng et al. / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxAppendix Table 1. Deﬁnitions of variablesLife satisfaction Responses to the question “Overall, how satisﬁed are you with your life nowadays?” on a ﬁve-point Likert-scale (i.e.
very dissatisﬁed, dissatisﬁed, neutral, satisﬁed, and very satisﬁed)
Homeownership The household owns residential property
Full homeownership The household has full ownership residential property
Partial homeownership The household has partial ownership residential property
Minor homeownership The household has minor ownership residential property
No homeownership The household does not own any residential property
Number of full homeownership Total number of full ownership residential properties owned by the household
Number of partial homeownership Total number of partial ownership residential properties owned by the household
Number of minor homeownership Total number of minor ownership residential properties owned by the household
Informal home loan The respondent has a home loan from relatives, friends or other private/informal channels
Formal home loan The respondent has one or more of the three types of formal home loans, i.e. housing provident fund loan,
commercial bank loan or portfolio loan.
Housing provident fund loan Home loan obtained from the housing provident fund managed by the government
Commercial bank loan Home loan obtained from a commercial bank
Portfolio loan A combination of housing provident fund loan and commercial bank loan
Ln remaining informal home loan Natural logarithm of the amount of unrepaid informal home loan
Ln remaining formal home loan Natural logarithm of the amount of unrepaid formal home loan
Purchased discounted house The respondent purchased property at a discounted price from his/her work unit
Ln property value per square meter Natural logarithm of property value per square meter
Number of social insurance schemes The number of social insurance schemes (i.e. pension, medical and unemployment insurance and housing provident
fund) in which the respondent participates
Chinese Communist Party member The respondent is a member of the Chinese Communist Party
Rural-urban migrant Most Chinese are assigned with either rural or urban hukou (household registration). A rural-urban migrant is
generally deﬁned as a person working outside his or her place of hukou registration. Rural-urban migrants without
a local urban hukou cannot access the same rights and social beneﬁts enjoyed by urban residents.
Household size The number of household members
Local public safety Response to the question “What is your perception of public safety in the locality?” on a ﬁve-point Likert scale (i.e. very
poor, poor, natural, good and very good).
Risk aversion Response to the question “Which type of project would you invest in if you have the money?” The ﬁve options are:
unwilling to take any risk; below-average risk and below-average return; average risk and average return;
above-average risk and above-average return; and high risk and high return.
Economy expectation Response to the question “What is your expectation of China's economic prospects in the next three to ﬁve years?” The
ﬁve options are: very poor, poor, almost the same as now, good, very good.
Residential property price expectation Response to the question “What is your expectation of residential property prices in the coming year?” The ﬁve options
are: signiﬁcant decrease, slight decrease, no change, slight increase, signiﬁcant increase.
Commodity price expectation Response to the question “What is your expectation of commodity prices in the coming year?” The ﬁve options are:
signiﬁcant decrease, slight decrease, no change, slight increase, signiﬁcant increase.
Interest rate expectation Response to the question “What is your expectation of interest rates in the coming year?” The ﬁve options are:
signiﬁcant decrease, slight decrease, no change, slight increase, signiﬁcant increase.
Ln vehicle value Natural logarithm of current value of all vehicles owned by the household
Ln bank deposit Natural logarithm of current value of all bank deposits (sum of term and demand deposits) owned by the household
Ln share and fund value Natural logarithm of current value of all shares and funds owned by the household
Work unit (danwei) Seven types: 1. Government agency; 2. Public institution (shiye danwei; e.g. bus company, public school and water
supply); 3. Enterprise; 4. Not-for-proﬁt/non-governmental organization; 5. Military service; 6. Others; 7. None of
the above
Employment relation (bianzhi) Five types: 1. Public servant (gongwuyuan); 2. Employee of public institution (shiye bianzhi); 3. Military servant; 4.
Others; 5. None of the above
Occupation Eight types: 1. Manager/head of government agency/public institution/enterprise; 2. Professional/technician; 3.
Ofﬁcer, clerk and so on; 4. Ordinary employee of business/service sector; 5. Ordinary employee of
agriculture/forestry/husbandry/ﬁshery; 6. Operator of equipment/machine; 7. Soldier; 8. None of the above
Industry 22 types: 1. Agriculture/forestry/husbandry/ﬁshery; 2. Mining; 3. Manufacturing; 4. Electrify, gas and water supply;
5. Construction; 6. Transportation, postal and telecommunication services; 7. IT services; 8. Wholesale and retail
trades; 9. Hotels, catering services and tourism; 10. Financial services; 11. Real estate; 12. Rental and business
services; 13. Scientiﬁc research, technological services and geologic examination; 14. Environmental and public
services; 15. Resident and other services; 16. Education; 17. Health, social security and social services; 18. Culture,
sports and entertainment; 19. Public management and social organization; 20. International organizations; 21.
Others; 22. None of the above
Province 21 provinces, municipalities and autonomous administrative regions: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin,
Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi,
Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, and QinghaiReferences
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